2. Specific and General Words.

(1) Difference between Specific an Genera.. Words.—We say very different things in the sentences, "Each star is poised on the finger of God ;" and "Every heavenly body is held in the hand of the Di¬vine Being ;" yet, the two ideas are not so remote from each other that the one could not be put for the other. The general idea is the same in each, but the one is specific, the other general. In the first, the statement applies to the stars alone ; in the second, to all the heavenly bodies. In the first, we specify the finger; in the second the hand. In the first, God stands out as an unclassified and supreme personality; in the second, He is classed among beings, and distinguished only by the attribute of divinity. The difference be. tween the two propositions does not lie in any figura. tire quality, for the figure is of the same kind in each. Yet, the former is plainly the more striking form of expression. On what ground is the first more impres¬sive The answer is obvious : the first is more spe¬cific. The word "star" instantly suggests a definite image ; but "every heavenly body" is vague, since it includes sun, moon, and stars, and to an educated mind, comets and meteors. "Poised" presents to the mind a specific kind of holding, while "held" is capa¬ble of a number of specific senses, between which the mind is at a loss which to choose. "Finger" points out the exact part of the hand, while "hand," having a great number of parts, suggests a complex conception. "God" suggests all that the mind has associated with that specific name, as representing a person ; while "Divine Being" is a more diffused notion. Divesting the sentence entirely of its specific character, and put¬ting the conception in a still more general form, we have, "All things are sustained by divine power ; "—. which is so general as not to present any image to the mind, and makes very little impression upon us.

(2) Reagens for the Superior Force of Specific Expreadom—The more specific a statement, the less mental power is required to put it before the mind for cognition. The tendency of philosophic minds is to generalize, to reduce all truth to a formula which shall be the concentrated expression of the whole. The difficulty which the human mind has experienced in arriving at any such formula, and the conflicting notions of men in all ages with respect to the truth or falsity of abstract statements, are sufficient evidence of the obstacles to be overcome in interpreting such forms of expression. Generic names offer the amplest oppor¬tunity for sophistry, because what may be true of some members of a class may not be true of other members of the same class. The writer may have in mind one subdivision of a class of which his affirmation is true, while the generic name may suggest to his reader another subdivision of the class of which the affirma¬tion is not true. To many minds not habituated to abstract thought, abstract terms suggest no ideas what¬ever, but men of all grades of intelligence know the names of specific objects, acts, and relations, and these are at once suggested by the appropriate sign. It is not true that the imagination is more severely taxed by specific and concrete than by general and abstract terms. A dog, a horse, a house, or the moon is pre¬sented for cognition on the canvas of the imagination as soon as the verbal sign denoting it is uttered. Terms like animal, building, and heavenly orb are much more taxing on the powers, since they involve the presenta¬tion to the mind, not of a thing, an act, or a relation, but of a conception which has no correlative in the actual world, but which is made up of qualities taken from all the individuals of the class which we have ever seen. Scarcely any uneducated man can define the word animal. He will almost certainly exclude man and bird and fish ; he will be sure to exclude oyster, and, possibly, he will represent all animals as having four legs. The use of specific terms, when possible, obviates much of the difficulty in the interpreting mind, not exacting of it a laborious and probably futile use of the imagination in presenting for cognition a host of irrele¬vant objects, which, if presented, would only embarrasi and confuse the mind.

(3) A Choice of Terms Possible.—Those who are fond of regarding language as the incarnation of thoughts, may consider these facts and principles of small value to style, on the ground that, with a given idea to be expressed, a writer has no choice between generic and specific words. On this question of option Dr. Whately says : "It might be supposed at first sight, that an author has little or no choice on this point, but must employ either more or less general terms according to the objects he is speaking of. There is, however, in almost every case, great room for such a choice as we are speaking of ; for, in the first place, it depends on our choice whether or not we will employ terms more general than the subject requires ; which may almost always be done consistently with truth and propriety, though not with energy ; if it be true that a man has committed murder, it may correctly be asserted, that he has committed a crime : if the Jews were 'exterminated' and Jerusalem demolished' by Vespasian's army,' it may be said, with truth, that they were 'subdued' by an enemy,' and their 'capital' taken." *