FIGURES FOUNDED ON CONTIGUITY.

1. The Theory Explained. In order to understand how figures of speech are based on contiguity in time or space, a prefatory ex¬planation of this form of association is necessary. "In passing along a road which we have formerly traveled in company with a friend, the particulars of the con¬versation in which we were then engaged are fre¬quently suggested. to us by the objeots' we meet with. In such a scene we recollect that a particular subjecl was started ; and in passing the different houses, and plantations, and rivers, the arguments we were dis¬cussing when we last saw them, recur spontaneously to the memory. The connection which is formed in the mind between the different words of a discourse we have committed to memory, the connection between the different notes of a piece of music in the mind of the musician, are all obvious instances of the same law of our nature."* A whole cannot be conceived without parts, nor parts without a whole ; every thing being either a cause or an effect, or both, nothing can be thought of without implying an antecedent or a conse¬quent. Thus "local contiguity binds up objects other¬wise unconnected into a single object of perceptive thought." f Of the objects so united in our thoughts, some are more simple and concrete than others, hence interpreting power is economized by selecting the former for figurative expression. 2. Forms of Contiguity. Contiguity assumes three forms : (1) a whole is related to its parts ; (2) an object is related to its ac¬companiments; and (3) emotions are co-existent in the mind. Each of these forms of contiguity is the basis of one or more figures of speech. The relation of a whole to its parts gives rise to Synecdoche ; the rela¬tion of an object to its accompaniments, to Metonymy the co-existence of emotions, to Exclamation, Hyper¬bole, Apostrophe, and Vision. L SYNECDOCHE. 1. Forms of Synecdoche. • This figure has three forms : (1) a part is put for the whole of an object ; (2) the whole is put for a part ; and (3) the material is put for the thing itself. (1)	A Part for the Whole.—There is a clear econ¬omy of interpreting power in the first form of synec- • doche. Whenever any object is mentioned, some pur¬pose is aimed at. The nature of this purpose determines the view taken of the object. Some one part must be more suggestive e this view than any other. Thus man may be variously designated by one of his parts, according to the view taken of him. Considered as a messenger bearing good news, we may say of him, "How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things ;" viewed as demanding bodily sustenance, "This officer has a thousand mouths to feed ; " contemplated merely as a worker, "All hands were busily occupied ;" regarded simply as a human being, "Eight souls were saved." Thus we may continue to abstract this or that part, according to our purpose. In all these cases there is an obvious force resulting from the designation of a part. That which is perti¬nent is brought directly to the attention ; that which is irrelevant is kept out of view ; the simple takes the place of the complex, the specific of the abstract. Hence the obvious principle, that the part most sug¬gestive of the specific view should be selected. (2)	The Whole for a Part—Sometimes, on the contrary, there is an economy of interpreting power in using the whole for a part. There is here danger of violating the principle, that the specific is more expres¬sive than the general But there are cases where a general word is very important. The breadth of in¬clusion renders an expression more forcible when the intention is to heighten the effect by implying vast ex¬tent or magnitude. To speak of the "Roman nation" does not impress the mind with the grandeur and ex- 'Rut of the empire which embraced nearly every civil¬ized laud, so well as to say, "the Roman world." So "the country is in arms," "the whole land was aglow with excitement," "the nation awoke with indigna¬tion,"—are much more expressive of a universal move¬ment than to speak of "men," "patriots," etc. (3) The Material for the Object—The material of an instrument may be more expressive of the idea than the outlines associated with its proper name, and hence the third form of synecdoche often has an economic value. Thus "gold" is often more suggestive than "money." In the following stanza "steel" is better than "sword," as suggestive of the fineness of edge which a steel blade is capable of taking : "The wounds that are dealt by that murderous god Will never yield case for the surgeons to heal." IL METONYMY. 1. Forms of Metonymy. Metonymy is the designation of an object by one of its accompaniments. Rhetoricians have divided and subdivided metonymies until the most capacious mem¬ory would be taxed to retain them. They are as num¬erous as the various forms of accompaniment. A three fold classification will furnish illustrative instances of this figure. Metonymies may be divided into the fol¬lowing classes : (1) the effect is put for the cause or the cause for the effect ; (2) the sign is put for the thing signified ; and (3) the container is put for the thing contained. (1)	Came and Effect.—The connection of an effect with a cause is an intuition of the human mind. The effect may be better or less known than the cause, ac¬cording to circumstances. Sometimes a complex and obscure cause produces a simple and obvious effect ; and, on the other hand, a simple and obvious cause may produce a complex and obscure effect. A proper metonymy uses the better known for the less known, either the cause for the effect, or the effect for the cause. In the words of Junius, "can gray hairs make folly venerable ?" the effect, "gray hairs," is pui-, for the cause, old age, because the color of the hair is a visible and inseparable characteristic of old age, while old age is a mere abstraction. On the other hand, the cause may be more suggestive than the effect. Thus, "They have Moses and the prophets," is more expres¬sive than "They have the law and the prophecies," for in this instance the persons are less abstract than the terms "law" and "prophecies." (2)	The Sign and the Thing Signified.—By as sociation certain signs and symbols become significant of general notions. Thus "crown," "scepter," and "purple," are indicative of sovereignty, because long associated with it as its external concomitants and rep¬resentative symbols. Proverbs naturally couch them¬selves in this form of metonymy. "The pen [literary power] is mightier than the sword [military power]." . (3) Container and Thing Contained.—An economy of mental processes, but more especially cf time and new words, is often secured by putting the container for the contained. Thus we speak of the "table," meaning the eatables on it ; of the "house," meaning its occupants; of the "camp," meaning its tents and uiPage 2. The Law of Selection. The principle of economy in all metonymies re¬quires the selection of that which best suits the pur¬pose of the idea. The mind has a tendency to unity of conception, and hence to the rejection of all dis¬tracting details. Metonymy satisfies this tendency of the mind by removing particulars that would compli¬cate thought, and by furnishing what is most necessary to the conception to be formed. Like most other figures of speech, it is not well adapted to strictly scientific statements. Ill.—CO-EXISTENT EMOTIONS. 1. Meaning of Co-existent Emotions. When two emotions, or an emotion and a percep¬tion co-exist, they are associated by contiguity of time ; 1. e., as has been explained, by forming parts of the same mental state. Joy, anger, surprise, and other similar emotions, naturally express themselves in ex¬clamatory and exaggerated forms. These forms be¬come associated with the emotions to which they corre¬spond. Hence, when the forms are used, they recall the emotions with which they are associated in the mind. Thus they become exponents of the communi. eator's feelings, and assist the interpreter in under¬standing with what intention the words are used. 2. Figures Founded on Co-existent Emotions. Co-existent emotions give rise to four kinds of figurative expression : (1) Exclamation, when the idea is associated with strong emotion ; (2) Hyperbole, when exaggerated statement is employed ; (3) Apostrophe, when the idea is so vividly conceived as to lead to direct address ; and (4) Vision, when the past or future is conceived of as present. (1) Exolamation.—Not every exclamation is a fig¬ure of speech. The expressions Oh! Alas and the like are plain language, because they fail to fulfill the condition of figures, that one thing is expressed in the form of another. Interjections are as natural ex¬pressions of feeling as verbs and nouns are respectively of actions and objects. The primary and natural expression of strong emotion is not a proposition, but an interjection. The proposition,—subject, copula and predicate,—is the intellective form of utterance ; the exclamation is the emotive.* When a proposition is thrown into the interjectional form, i. e., is spoken or written in the manner of an interjection, the emotive form of that particle is made the medium of expressing an idea primarily intellective ; then it becomes figura¬tive. Hamlet, speaking in the propositional form would have said : "Man is a wonderful work ; noble in reason, infinite in faculties, express and admirable in form and moving, in action like an angel, in appre¬hension like a god, the beauty of the world, the para¬gon of animals." But filled with emotion by these high thoughts, Shakespeare makes him speak in the interjectional form : "What a piece of work is man ! how noble in reason how infinite in faculties in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a god ! the beauty of the world 1 the paragon of animals !" (2) Hyperbole.—Emotion once excited, though brief, is cumulative. As the eye runs along the ascend¬ing lines of some cathedral spire until it leaps into free space, so emotion rising with indescribable swiftness, is soon far above its primary causes. Hence exaggera¬tion is natural to imaginative and emotional people, who conceive more vividly than facts allow, and speak even more vividly than they conceive. The philosophy of the figure is, that facts are measured by the strength of the co-existent emotion, and hence, in expression, are magnified to correspond with the emotion. The hyperbole is, therefore, a form of expression in which one thing is said under the form of another more im¬pressive than itself. The intelligent hearer is aware of this, and makes a due allowance. Saul and Jona¬than are represented as "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions." Every intelligent reader knows that this is said in the exaggerated form suggested by strong emotion, and yet he feels, at the same time, that by this very exaggeration that feeling of wonder and admiration which prompted the form of expression is communicated to himself. In this lies the value of the figure in economizing interpreting power. The hyperbole may be made one of the most forci ble helps to expression. Milton's fondness for it is everywhere evident. Thus in " Comus" : " I was ail oaf And took in strains that might create a soul Under the ribs of Death." In "Ii Penseroso" : "Bath notes as warbled to the string Drew iron tears down Pluto's cheek." This happy instance in "Paradise Lost" is but one of hundreds : "He called His legions, angel forms, who lay entranced Thick as autumnal Isaacs that strew the brooks In Vallombrosa." Much of the brilliancy of humorous writing is de rived from hyperbole. Thus, in "Henry IV." Shakc speare makes Falstaff say : "There's but a shirt and tu half in all my company; and the half shirt is two nap¬kins, tacked together, and thrown over the shoulders like a herald's coat without sleeves." Hood writes of a night so terrible that a Christian farmer would not leave his scarecrow out of shelter ; and Jerrold, of a man so unwisely benevolent that he held his umbrella over a duck in a shower of rain. No high purpose of style is subserved when a lady speaks of a "sublime lemonade," a "heart-rending cup of tea," or "magnificent soup." The whole tendency of such exaggeration is, to weaken the force of every utteram e of those who thus abuse speech, and finally to emasculate language. (8) Apostrophe.—In the higher flights of imagina¬tion, the absent are conceived of as present, the inani mate as living, the abstract as personal, and are di¬rectly addressed. This figure is clearly allied to per¬sonification, with which it is often combined. The national hymn "America" is in the apostrophic form, and how much it owes to this may be seen by con¬structing a parody, altering "My country, 'tis of thee," to the third person. The use of this figure presupposes elevated emotion, and would be absurd without it. (4) MiOn.—Vision has sometimes been confounded with apostrophe, but the two are entirely distinct. While apostrophe consists in a direct address, vision treats the past and the future as if they were the pres¬ent. It does not invoke, but describes. A striking illustration is found in Edward Everett's description of the perils of the Mayflower : "Methinks I see it now—that one solitary, adventurous ves¬sel, the Mayflower of a forlorn hope, freighted with the prospects of a future state, and bound across the unknown sea. I behold It pursuing with a thousand misgivings the uncertain, the tedi¬ous voyage. I see them now, scantily supplied with provisions ; crowded almost to suffocation in their ill-stored prison ; delayed by calms, pursuing a circuitous route. The awful voice of the storm howls through the rigging ; the laboring masts seem straining from their base: he dismal sound of the pump is heard ; the ship leaps, as it were madly from billow to billow ; the ocean breaks and settles with ingulfing floods over the floating deck, and beats with deadening, shivering weight against the staggering vessel." 3. Explanation of these Figures. The figures founded on co-existent emotions have been touched hastily, in order that their rationale might be explained in one place. Sir William Hamilton has established the law, enunciated by Kant, that "Knowledge and feeling, though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other." This law explains the figures founded on co-existent emotions, and furnishes a foundation on which to base laws for their use. All these figures are products of strong emotion. The strength of the emotions obliterates distinctions of fact which are obvious to minds not thus aroused. In hy¬perbole, wide differences are overlooked ; in apostrophe, the chasm between life and death, personality and in¬sensibility, is crossed with a leap ; in vision, centuries are swept out of view, and the past seems to coincide with the present. Emotion of any kind is eclectic, ex¬cluding from view all that is not in harmony with it¬self, and intensifying and magnifying what is accordant with itself. "When we are under a strong emotion, all things discordant with it," says Bain, "are kept out of sight. A strong volitional urgency will subdue an opposing consideration actually before the mind ; but intense feeling so lords it over the intellectual trains that the opposing considerations are not even allowed to be present. One would think it were enough that the remote considerations should give way to the near and pressing ones, so that the video meliora ' might still remain with the deteriora sequor' ; but, in truth, the flood of emotion sometimes sweeps away for the moment every vestige of the opposing absent, as if they had at no time been a present reality. Our feelings not merely play the part of rebels or innovators against the canons of the past, they are like destroying Vandals, who efface and consume the records of what has been."* Originally produced by the contemplation of reali¬ties, emotion stimulates the fancy, which "gives tc airy nothing a local habitation and a name ;" then, catch¬ing inspiration from its own creations, the dominant emotion wholly influences the trains of thought, until distinctions of space, time, cause and effect, and value, are obliterated or transferred. An angry man sees no beauty in his foe, a lover no blemish in his mistress, an enthusiast no fallacy in his theory. Thus also the poet and the orator, when the "eye is with fine frenzy roll¬ing," construe the universe to suit their mood. Stars and flowers become sisters, the trees and clouds assume personality, the dead are recalled from the world of shades, and are addressed as if living. To the fancy of the poet, all this is momentarily real, and the inade¬quate expression of a truth beyond all powers of utter¬ance to express ; to the cool critic, who catches no spark of the poetic fire, it is superlative nonsense. Hence the realistic verdict of Bentham, in which he pro¬nounces poetry to be "misrepresentation in verse." Hence also what is loudly applauded as oratory when the enthusiasm of the assembly runs at full tide, seems bombastic and insipid to the deliberate reader. 4. Lavrs.of these Figures. Two laws for the use of these strongly emotive fig¬ures grow out of their relation to the economy of inter¬preting power : (1) they aid the expression of strong emotion, since exaggeration is naturally associated with it ; and (2) they are effective only when preceded by such trains of thought and feeling as will justify exaggeration.