A proposition is confirmed to the mind by Argumentation.

those of the first, second, third, and fourth figures, the hypothetical into the conditional and disjunctive, as in the following scheme : {1st Figure 1.	Categorical	rrere Argumesta i ii.E11411071etememe°	4th Figure { 2.	Hypothetical. Conditional Disjunctive. This is evidently a division according to the form in which they may be stated, for any argument may be stated in any of the forms mentioned. (2) Subject Matter.—Another division of argu¬ments is into necessary or demonstrative, and moral or probable ; thus : Arguments. i h.N4coessaor,poror rionstrative, This is evidently a division according to the nature of the subject-matter. In mathematics, all arguments are necessary ; in human affairs, they are generally only probable. (3) Purpoge.—Arguments are also divided into direct or indirect, according as the intention is to establish a given proposition, or to reduce a proposition to an absurdity. Arguments h . Indirect. This is plainly a division according to the purpose for which the arguments are used. (I) Arguments as Such.—The three schemes of division above mentioned do not divide arguments as such, but according to some peculiarity of form or use. Hence arguments may at once belong to all three classes. For example, the same argument may be a syllogism, necessary and direct. In order to find a principle of division by which to classify arguments according to their essential nature, we must find wherein lies the essence of an argument. Arguments are distinguished from other propositions by some relation between the subject-matter of the conclu¬sion and the subject-matter of the proposition used as argument. A true classification of arguments will be a classification of the kands of relation which may sub¬sist between things. We find these kinds of relation to he three. Let the conclusion to be established be, "It will rain to-morrow." What proposition can confirm this conclusion, or, in other words, serve as an argument to prove it ? Clearly none whose subject-matter is not related to the production of rain. "The clouds are forming," would be such a proposition, because the forming of the clouds shows a cause which, if unim¬peded, will produce rain. Let the proposition be, "It has rained." What proposition will confirm this conclusion ? "The ground is everywhere wet," would be a proposition whose subject-matter is related to the conclusion, since the general wetness is a sign or effect which requires rain as its necessary condition. Let the proposition be, "Tyrants are selfish men." The proposition "Omar was a tyrant and a selfish man," would be an argument, because Ca3sar is an example of tyrants, and the subject-matter of the two propositions is related by resemblance. Causes, signs, and resemblances, are the only kinds of relation in the subject-matter by which a proposi¬tion can be established. The argument from cause is called the a priori argument. The arguments from sign and resemblance are called a posteriori arguments. The division of arguments as such is exhibited in the bllowing soheme : {I. A priori. Ammonia. 1. Sign. II. A posteriori. it. Resemblance. These classes, with their subdivisions, will be treated more specifically in the following sections. SECTION I. A PRIORI ARGUMENTS. 1. Nature of the Argument. The a priori argument is an argument from cause to effect. By the word cause is here meant whatever would account for a fact, if the fact were admitted. In this sense the word sometimes but not always indicates a physical cause. If we were to adduce the proposi¬tion "The sun's rays are most nearly vertical in sum¬mer," to prove that "The earth is warmest in summer," the logical and physical causes would coincide. If we were to claim that A B and C possess intelligence be¬cause they are men, the logical cause would be distinct from any physical cause, for A B and C are no more intelligent because they are men than they are men be¬cause they are intelligent. Yet, since the fact that they are men accounts for, i. e., explains why they should be regarded as possessing intelligence, this is an a priori, argument. The word cause is used in the popular sense. 2. Extent of Inference from a Cause. When a cause is known to exist, we may infer from its existence any effect which it is capable of produc ing, unless impediments are presented to its operation. Thus, if a man is known to entertain a bitter hatred of a neighbor, and that neighbor is found dead, with obvious marks of assassination, suspicion may point to the hostile neighbor. If impediments to the operation of hatred as the cause of this murder, such as fear of punishment, the fear of God, a forgiving spirit, ab¬sence from the place, or some similar circumstances, cannot be shown, the suspicion will be very strong. In this case, however, a posteriori proofs would be needed for conviction, since other causes might have produced this effect, even if hatred be admitted as an adequate cause. Let the case be a purely physical one. Let the steam be turned on in a locomotive, and it is cer¬tain that the locomotive will move, unless impeded by too heavy a train, or some other mechanical preventive. 3. The Absence of Cause. As from an existing cause we may infer its effect, so, on the other hand, the absence of a cause is proof that the effect will not follow. If a tree is known to be without vitality, it is certain that it will not put forth leaves and bear fruit. If a man has no motive to commit a crime, and no opportunity of performing it, we may infer that it should not be laid to his charge It may not always be necessary to assign causes, when the a posteriori proofs are overwhelming, for some causes are beyond our discovery, although their effects prove that they exist. 4. The Degree of Connection between Cause and Effect. The degree of connection between a cause and its effect is measured by the probability of hinderauce. As this probability of hinderance varies greatly, so must the certainty of an effect when its cause exists and is operative. Physical causes are more closely connected with their effects than moral or mental. If we know the level of a water course, we know with certainty in what direction the water will flow. If a man is known to hate his neighbors, it is by no means certain that he will injure them ; for he may be de¬terred by many motives unknown to any one besides himself. Even threatened violence with an opportu¬nity for its exercise, would not place an alleged crime beyond all doubt. Wherever the will is concerned, the connection of cause and effect is uncertain. 5. Probability Established by a priori Arguments. Probability is shown by accounting for an event, or producing its causes. In poetry and romance, it is not necessary that the causes should be real, but they should be such as to account for the effects. In fic¬tion, an important rule is, to relate only such incidents as can be accounted for by the causes shown to be op¬erative. The explanation need not be given until the mind is lost in mystery, but it shows a lack of art to close a volume without having given to the whole an air of probability, or, at least, of verisimilitude. Future events rest wholly upon a priori arguments. Examples may, indeed, be used to establish the prob¬ability of future occurrences, but not directly. The example implies the existence of a cause which will be likely to operate again as it has in the given case- This cause then becomes an a ortiori argument. 6. Ambiguity of Causal Words. Such words as why, because, and therefore, are am¬biguous, since they may designate more than one kind of sequence. Clearness of thought in the use of apri¬ori arguments requires a close distinction between these different senses. The word why for example, may in¬quire after the physical cause ; as, "Why do thunder storms occur in summer ? " the logical cause ; as, "Why is the sum of the angles in a triangle equal to two right angles ?" or the final cause or purpose, as, "Why is man filled with aspirations after immortality ?" SECTION IL ARGUMENTS PROM SIGN. 1. Nature of the Argument. The argument from sign is an argument from an effect to a condition. An effect implies the existence of some condition so connected with the effect that the existence of the condition may be inferred from the existence of the effect. For example, a man is found with a bloody dagger in his band, and another man is found near by stabbed to death. The possession of a bloody dagger is an effect implying some use of the dagger as its condition. If no other 'condition than a murderous use of the dagger can be suggested, the possessor of the dagger is proved to be the murderer. If another use of the dagger is avowed, guilt must be determined by the balance of probability that the murderous use, and not the alleged use was the con¬dition. If a condition be absolutely essential to the effect, the existence of the effect is demonstrative proof of the condition. If a watch were found in an unpopulated island, it would be demonstrative proof that it had been carried there, that being the necessary condition of its being there. The presence of the watch would be probable evidence that a man had been there, but not demonstrative, for other conditions are supposable, such as the wreck of a vessel, and the drifting of some portion to the island. 2. The Calculation of Chances. This leads us at once to the doctrine of chances, since it is often necessary to decide between several possible conditions, one of which must be inferred from the given effect. In the case above cited, a sophist might ask, what is the objection to the supposition that the watch was always on the island, was, in short, the product of unconscious natural forces ? Men have reasoned similarly about the fossils of extinct animals. They have asked why these objects may not have been produced just as they are, and for no distinct purpose. The obvious answer is, they show marks of design. But the elements of these fossils or of this watch, appar¬ently adjusted with so much skill, must exist in some form, why not in this ? There are as many chances against one form as against any other given form. The solution of this difficulty lies in the fad that such rea¬soning presents a false alternative. The proper com¬parison of chances is not between this arrangement of particles in the watch and some other determinate curangement, but between the probability of the watch being the product of unconscious forces and the prob. ability of its being made by a man and brought to the island in some way. The comparison of chances in the ease of the fossil is not between this arrangement as opposed to another, but between the probability that it was formed for no purpose, and the probability that it is the remains of some animal. 3. Proof of a Cause. Among conditions, some have no causal connection with a phenomenon, others have such a connection. To use Whately's illustration, if a man dies to-day, we may infer that he was alive yesterday. His being alive yesterday, however, while an essential condition of his dying to-day, has no tendency to produce his death to-day. Some conditions have a causal relation to the effect. If the man dies to-day, some antecedent must be supposed to have produced this effect. It is impossible to prove any condition as a cause from the effect alone. ' A cause may prove an effect, if there are no hinderances, although there may be other causes ; bat the cause cannot be inferred from the effect, for it can never be certain that the cause supposed to be proved is the only or operative cause. Practically the cause may be inferred from the effect with sufficient probability to establish conviction when the essential condition seems to be only one. In that case, since every effect must have a cause, we infer that the sole condition must be the cause. But this proof is not demonstrative, for the true cause may be different from the supposed cause, and yet escape our detection. 4. Testimony. Testimony is a kind of sign implying as a condition if its existence the truth of the fact attested. The • laws of motive render it probable that testimony would not be given if the attestation were not called forth by fact. The same law leads us to infer the possibility of a different condition, as incompetency, falsehood, etc. In every case where testimony is used as an argu¬ment, we must decide between the truth of the attes¬tation on the one hand, and the incompetency or cor¬ruption of the witness on the other. The decision of such questions requires us to attend to several particu¬lars affecting the value of testimony. (1)	The Number of Witneeses.—The greater the number of witnesses, other things being equal, the greater the value of the testimony. The number, however, is frequently overestimated, as when men bear witness to the truth of certain doctrines of religion and science. Having never given these a personal in¬vestigation, their testimony is not really to the truth of these doctrines, but to the fact that they are held as true. (2)	Character of Witnesses.—The moral and intel¬lectual character of the witness is important to the value of the testimony. A man may be so deceived as to believe that to have happened which in reality never occurred. Dr. Whately regards the testimony of ignorant and prejudiced men as especially valuable when it attests things too abstruse for them to invent, or contrary to their prejudices. (3) concurrent Witnesses.—Concurrent testimony is especially valuable if there has been no opportunity for collusion. Too close concurrence, however, leads to the suspicion of previous conference, and the inven¬tion of a tale. The testimony of different witnesses who have observed the same transaction ought to pre¬sent differences of detail from their having occupied different points of view, and from their subjective modification of the facts, as well as from observing at slightly different periods of time. The slight differ¬ence in the stories of the evangelists with reference to the garment worn by our Saviour at his crucifixion, is confirmatory of their trustworthiness as witnesses. The difference may naturally be accounted for either ay the different times of day when the observations were made, or by an optical difference not uncommon, or, perhaps, both. The divergence of statement is proof that there was no collusion. (4) Adverse Witnesses.— Adverse testimony is usually incidental, Such evidence will generally be found in some minute detail, but the intrinsic insignificance of the circumstance is no measure of its value in an ar¬gument. Much skill in cross-examination may be necessary to draw out the testimony of an unwilling witness, or to show the inconsistency of his story. Dr. Whately cautions against brow-beating a witness, and sums up the whole philosophy of cross-examination in the forcible sentence : "The more the storm blusters, the more carefully he wraps round him the cloak which a warm sunshine will often induce him to throw off." (5)	Character of Pacts Atteste5.—We need to distinguish sharply between matters of fact and mat¬ters of opinion. Witnesses almost invariably mingle their own opinions and explanations with the facts lotuslly observed. Testimony as to matters of fact is valuable when the witness is honest and has sound senses. Testimony to matters of opinion requires in¬telligence, or the ability to form a judgment, in addi¬tion to honesty and sound organs of perception. Any thing beyond the natural expectations of the witness, and so not likely to enter his mind except by the actual occurrence, is of additional weight on that account. So the omission from a story of what would naturally oc¬cur to a fabricator, is indicative of truth. (6)	The Denial of Testimony.—To deny the story of a witness is to believe that he has invented it, or is deluded. Here we need to remember that belief and disbelief are the same mental state with regard to con¬tradictory propositions. The proper opposite of belief is doubt, or indecision. To reject testimony is, there¬fore, to affirm that some other condition than truth must be inferred,—invention, or misunderstanding. 5. Authority. The opinions of competent men are often used as an argument, and in this case the argument is called proof from authority. Authority is a kind of sign, since its existence supposes the truth- of what is as¬serted as a condition of the assertion's being made. Thus, in legal decisions, the ability and honesty of the judge, and the careful advocacy of both sides by com¬petent lawyers, assure us that the decision would not have been what it is, unless truth and law required it to be so. Quotations from the Scriptures, precedents in law, the opinions of philosophers, and the decisions of physicians, are all valid arguments in their respec¬tive spheres, because their existence implies truth as the condition of their being what they are. The mul¬tiplicity of facts and the preoccupation of men with their special lines of investigation, render authority a chief source of conviction in departments of thought lying without our range of personal observation. Our religious, political, and philosophical doctrines, usually rest on this kind of proof. 6. The Progressive Argument. Another kind of argument belonging to the class called sign, is "the argument from progressive ap¬proach." It consists of a series of signs, each one of which proves more conclusively than the preceding that a certain condition exists. If we roll a ball along the floor, it ceases moving after it has rolled a short dis¬tance. We may infer from the effect, that friction and gravitation and the resistance of the air retard it, and that if these retarding causes were removed, it would roll on forever. We roll a smoother ball over a smoother floor, and the duration of its motion is in¬creased. If we continue to diminish the resistance as much as possible, the duration of the motion in¬creases in proportion to this diminution. A succes¬sion of signs satisfies the mind that if these means of resistance were entirely removed, a body with a given momentum would move on forever with undiminished velocity. This argument may be applied to moral as well as to physical cases. Bishop Butler has employed it in the "Analogy" to show the inherent power of virtue. SECTION IIL ARGUMENTS PROM RESEMBLANCE. 1.	Nature of the Argument. The argument from resemblance rests upon the constancy of nature. It has no validity except upon the ground that what is true ir, a certain case or cases will be true in other similar cases. It is evident that this argument is liable to great abuse, owing to the difficulty of deciding what cases are essentially similar. If it be true that like cases are owing to like causes And produce like effects, it is equally true that unlike eases are not referable to like causes, and are not pro¬ductive of like effects. Hence the value of the argu¬ment depends wholly upon the detection of essential resemblances. 2.	Essential Resemblances. In order to test the validity of arguments founded on resemblance, we must have some criterion by which to distinguish between important and unimportant re¬semblances. It is not necessary that the cases should correspond in every particular. Men may belong to different nations, engage in different pursuits, and have different habits of life, yet they possess certain qualities in common with all men, and so far as they resemble one another what is affirmed of one may be affirmed of another. Sophists are ever ready with the objection that the cases differ in some respects. They may differ in all respects except one, and still the argument from resemblance may be valid. Again, the cases may re gamble each other in every particular except one, and still the argument from resemblance may be invalid. The essential point is, are the similar features owing to the same causer Let us take, for example, the proposition, "All tyrants are selfish." We may adduce as an argument the proposition, " Ofesar and Napoleon were selfish." Here the resemblance between "all tyrants" and "Omar and Napoleon" is the basis of the argument. Tyrants may differ in many personal qualities, in na¬tionality, and in the age in which they live. They re¬semble one another, however, in one important point, the desire of controlling others. If this distinctive point of resemblance be referable to selfishness as its sole cause, i.e., if tyranny be an effect of selfishness, it is clear that all tyrants are selfish, for selfishness is the cause of their being tyrants. Arguments from re¬semblance are but probable, for they are valid only in so far as they prove a common cause, but the proof of a cause is never more than probable. The degree of probability depends partly upon the closeness of con¬nection between the cause and its effect. As in a priori arguments, physical causes and effects are more closely connected than moral causes and effects. 3. Example. (1) Nature of Example.—Among the varieties of argument founded upon resemblance, the simplest, and, perhaps, most common is example. The logical analysis of this argument is as follows. We assume, as a major premise, that whatever is true of the case adduced as an example, is universally true in like cases. In the minor premise we assert something to be true in the example. In the conclusion we infer that what has been asserted is true of all like cases. Using this con¬clusion as a major premise, we assert in the minor that an individual case belongs to the class mentioned in the major, and our conclusion is, that the assertion in the major applies to the individual case. (2)	Invented Examples.—Fictitious cases are often adduced as arguments. They are legitimate in propor¬tion to their verisimilitude. Aristotle cites an instance of invented example used by Socrates, in which the latter shows the absurdity of choosing magistrates by lot by the folly of selecting a pilot in the same man¬ner; since, if the lot fell on an unskilled person, it would probably result in the loss of the ship. Although only a supposed case, this example has considerable force. This force is wholly derived from its general truth 1. e., it is such a case as might arise, and if it should, the relations of cause and effect would be as represented. (3)	Illustrative Examples.— Examples are fre¬quently used merely as illustrations, not to confirm but to explain a proposition. Illustrative examples affirm nothing more than a resemblance, argumenta¬tive examples affirm a common cause of which the re¬semblance is the effect. Hence it is unfair to treat mere illustrations as if they were designed as argu¬ments. Fables and legends are frequently employed as embellishments of discourse, or to explain the gen¬eral meaning. It is sophistical to attack these as un¬real, as if the truth of the main proposition depended upon the truth of the illustrations. It is fair and im¬portant, however, to point out the fact that these ex¬planatory examples have no argumentative force, and should be taken, not as instances of the general truth alleged, but as supposed consequences of it. In this case the truth of the examples presupposes the general truth, and hence it would be arguing in a circle to prove the law from supposed instances. Suppositions illustrate, but prove nothing. 4. Induction. If we stop at the general conclusion of the first syl¬logism in the illustration of example, the argument is called induction. The cases from which the conclu¬sion is drawn may be one or many, according to the nature of the subject-matter. In physical investiga¬tion, one experiment may be sufficient to establish the conclusion. If, for example, a substance tarns blue litmus paper red at the first trial, the chemist is satis¬fied that the substance possesses acid properties. If five men have died in a certain town on five successive Saturdays, it would be a hasty inference to lay it down as certain that some citizen of that town will die on every following Saturday. As in the argument from example, we mast .eliminate as far as possible what is accidental, and determine what is essential and causal in the similar cases. This is done in several ways. (1) The Method of Agreement. —When two or more phenomena are uniformly associated, as a surface colder than the surrounding air and the production of dew, we infer that one of the associated phenomena is the cause of the other. There is great danger of error in the use of this method. Thus misfortune and piety may be associated uniformly in the enterprises of a man, but it would be fallacious to make the one the cause of the other, on that ground alone. (2)	The Method of Differenee.—When a phenom enon A is not associated with a phenomenon B, but is uniformly associated with a phenomenon C, we may infer that A is caused by some difference between B and C. When that difference lies in a single particular, that particular may be regarded as the cause of A, if it be of a causal nature. If, for example, times were hard under one administration of the government, and prosperous under a new rule, with no difference in the state of affairs except that a change had been made in the financial system, the new rule would properly be regarded as the cause of prosperity. This is the method of difference. This also is liable to sophistical uses. The failure to detect any other difference than the change may be owing to the limitation of our faculties or our facilities for knowing. A common laborer may be led by a demagogue to attribute to a new administration what is really owing to some other cause, as a good crop, or a demand for labor occasioned by a new discovery. (3)	The method of Besidnes.—If we carry out the method of difference as far as possible by removing one condition after another until one remains, we may re¬gard the remaining circumstance as the cause. If we wish to find the cause of a man's failure to perform a certain piece of work, we may show that his failure was not for want of help, for help was given ; nor of time, for there was sufficient time ; nor of ability, for he was fully capable ; nor on account of sickness, for he was in good health ; nor because of preoccupation, for he was at leisare ; nor from forgetfulness, for he was re¬minded at the time ; nor from indolence, for he was fond of labor ; we may infer that it was very probably unwillingness. This, however, cannot be inferred unless every other equally probable supposition has been excluded. This is called the method of residues. (4) The Method of Concomitant Variations.—If now we ary the circumstances, so as to produce grad¬ations of a phenomenon, we have the method of con¬comitant variations. If it be shown that the higher we raise the temperature of a mass of iron the more space the mass occupies, we conclude that heat expands iron. By these methods we determine whether or not a particular fact exists, and whether or not certain par¬ticular facts are similar. • By induction we infer that these particular truths are universal. No real induc¬tion is formally valid. In affirming that what is true of a part is true of the whole we transcend our actual knowledge, and hence may fall into error. The four methods above are intended to reduce this possible error to its minimum. 5. Analogy. The argument from analogy is founded on a re¬semblance of relations, while ordinary examples are founded on a direct resemblance. There is an analogy between the human heart and a great city, and hence it has. been argued that when the size of a city is greatly increased its functions are impaired. The argument for the inhabitation of the planets is of this kind, since they resemble the earth in their general relations, though not in all particulars. The argument from analogy has great force in winning the assent of super¬ficial thinkers, but its logical analysis reveals the dan¬ger of depending upon it, unless confirmed by collat¬eral proofs. SECTION IV. THE CONDUCT OF A DISCUSSION. Argumentation, unlike the other elementary forms of .discourse, admits of two sides, and implies mental conflict. The conduct of an argumentative discussion requires skill in addition to a knowledge of the different classes of arguments. We shall, therefore, in this section consider those principles of argumentation which govern the enforcement of our ideas when they are exposed to opposition. This subject naturally falls under the following heads: (1) the PREPARATION OF THE QUESTION; (2) the INTRODUCTION; (3) the CONFIRMA¬TION OF THE THESIS; and (4) REFUTATION. These will now be treated in their order. L THE PREPARATION OF THE QUESTION. 1. Necessity of Preparation. The importance of attending to the form of the proposition to be proved is equally great whether it is to be discussed affirmatively and negatively by differ¬ent persons, or is to constitute the theme of a single speaker or writer. It is not necessary that the propo¬sition be formally announced at the beginning. 11 it be offensive or insignificant, its announcement should be withheld until the facts and arguments have removed the prejudices against it. But if the proposition to be proved be laid down in the author's mind in the be¬ginning, and be steadily held in view throughout the 4iscussion, it will insure the absence of what is irrel errant, and impart to the whole train of argument the character of coherence and adaptation. 2.	Exposition. When the proposition is laid down, it should be carefully studied, in order to satisfy the mind that it is just what is meant to be asserted, and that we are prepared to establish precisely this proposition and not another allied to it. Debate is frequently rendered unnecessary by mere exposition ; the apprehension of the real meaning putting the question beyond all doubt. When the proposition is perfectly clear, a formal and avowed exposition of it is unnecessary. All ambiguities and special senses should be explained in the beginning. If the proposition is to be debated, it should be stated in the form of an affirmative resolu¬tion. The advocate of the affirmative assumes the burden of proof, and until arguments are advanced in confirmation of the proposition, none are needed in refutation. Much has been written on "presumption and burden of proof." The simple and universal rule on the subject is, that the burden of proof always lies with the affirmative. This rule is founded on the self- evident principle that no one should be bound to prove a negative. 3.	Concession. In the exposition of any question it will be seen that there are certain facts which both sides admit. These should be eliminated from the discussion by a con¬cession of their reality. Silence is often interpreted as concession. Caro should be taken to deprive an op¬ponent of the right to claim such a concession. A topic may be waived, with the express promise to con¬sider it at another time. This may properly be done, as it may not be possible to put the topic in its true light until certain facts and arguments have been presented. Sophists frequently waive a subordinate but important proposition, and evade any farther consideration of it, or finally claim that it is unne¬cessary. 4. Contrary Opinions. It is often advisable to state contrary opinions at the beginning. There are several advantages in this, belonging to different cases. When the only alterna¬tive opinion is manifestly absurd, the statement that it is the only alternative will win favor for the proposi¬tion maintained. When there are other alternatives besides the one assumed by our opponent, a statement of that fact has the effect of leading to the belief that if we are wrong, our opponent at least may not be right. Other theories may have to be cleared away before our own can be established. Burke begins his work on the "Sublime and Beautiful" by showing that beauty does not consist in "adaptation," "proportion," or "perfection." IL THE INTRODUCTION. 1. Design of an Introduction. An introduction is not an essential part of a com¬position. Its very name implies that it is preparatory to something else, which is complete in itself, but needs to be brought into relation with the time and occasion. Hence Cicero's rule was, to compose the introduction after he had finished the composition. Mere general¬ities are thus avoided, and the introduction is made truly subservient to its end. Although the attention needs to be stimulated less than at any other pare of a discourse, since all attend to the first few words, it is desirable to arouse interest by the character of the introduction. 2. Kinds of Introduction. Adaptation to its purpose requires that the intro¬duction vary with the character of the composition. A few varieties are enumerated by Dr. Whately which readily suggest others. (1)	Inquisitive.—The inquisitive introduction aims to arouse interest by asking some question, or showing the importance of what is to be treated. (2)	Paradosical.—Wheii one is perfectly sure of his proofs, it may stimulate interest to state the conclusion to be reached in same paradoxical way, or to represent it as strange or unusual. (3) Oorrestive.—It may be well to show that the subject has been misunderstood, neglected, or mis¬represented, and should therefore engage the attention. This may be called the corrective introduction. It is particularly appropriate if the subject be a trite one. (1) Preparatory.—It is sometimes necessary to guard against some mistake, explain some peculiarity in the discussion, or account for some deficiency. This has been called the preparatory introduction. (5) Narrative.—li is often desirable to inform the reader or hearer of some event, or to describe some state of affairs, necessary to be known for the compre¬hension of what is to follow. All historical questions require an introduction of this kind. This is the nar¬rative introduction. Two or more of these forms may be combined. III. CONFIRMATION. 1. The 'Uses of the Different Classes of Arguments. When the thesis has been laid down, formally or mentally, we need to confirm it by such arguments as are best suited to its nature. The uses of the various arguments will, therefore, now be considered. (1)	A Priori.—The a priori argument- is used to account for a fact, and to establish future events. As has been shown, we may infer an effect from the ex¬istence of a cause, proportionately to the tendency of the cause to produce the effect. In this way past events are explained, and future events are anticipated. (2)	Sign.—The argument from sign is used to establish a fact after its occurrence, or as a general truth. Thus murder could be proved by testimony, or by circumstantial signs, such as blood on the hands, possession of an identified weapon, an effort to conceal one's self, etc. A general truth may be proved by authority ; as, for example a legal or religious doctrine: (3) nosomblanoe.—Arguments from resemblance are less certain than the preceding kinds, but often quite as satisfactory to minds predisposed to the con¬clusion. They are most useful in showing the consis¬tency of an alleged fact. Induction is the means of establishing new general truths, as in the sciences. Future events are inferred from examples, but always on the assumption of a common cause uniformly acting. 2. The Arrangement of Arguments. (1)	Importance of Arrangement.—As in the mili¬tary art, so in composition, arrangement is of the greatest importance. If one were to attempt to prove that a miracle had been performed without giving any reason why it should be, the proofs would need to be very strong in order to be satisfactory. If, however, it be first shown that a revelation might be expected from a benevolent deity, and that it could not be con¬firmed without miracles, much less proof would be necessary. In the contest between Aschines and De¬mosthenes concerning the crown, the former requested the judges to require the latter to adopt the same arrangement in his reply as had previously been chosen by his adversary. Demosthenes rightly claimed that this demand was unfair, and chose his own order. (2)	Order of Arguments According to in&—It is plain that a priori arguments ought to have the pre¬cedence, since they render natural what might other¬wise seem improbable. A theory of the causes cannot always be given, but it is desirable that a fact be ac¬counted for. A posteriori arguments, or positive proofs of the facts, are then received with less hesitation. The argument from cause may not be sufficient. It does not follow because a phenomenon might occur, that it actually did occur. When antecedent probability has been established by arguments from cause to effect, arguments from sign and resemblance may be added to show that the causes alleged were actually operative, and did produce the alleged effect. (8) Order of Arguments A000rding to Strength.— The most obvious arguments should come first, yet not in such a way as to bring the weakest first. The Nes¬torian arrangement of troops, with the weakest in the middle, suggests an advantageous order of arguments. It avoids anti-climax, and at the same time opens the discussion with a strong argument. An inverse reca¬pitulation of the arguments also obviates the effect of anti-climax, when in the original order the weakest comes last. A mere mention of the weak arguments at the beginning, with the statement that you do not rely upon them or mean to use them, may often prove effective. (4) Proving by Inotanmento.—Sometimes it is necessary to divide a proposition into several, and to prove each of these by itself. If Paley in his Evidences had proceeded at once to prove that we ought to be¬lieve the statements of the Scriptures, his argument would have been unnecessary in the view of believers, and probably inconclusive in the view of skeptics. He proves several propositions which together establish his main proposition, and thus the discussion is made entertaining to believers and conclusive to many who were skeptical His successive propositions are as follows :— (a)	The apostles suffered. (b)	They suffered knowingly. (c)	They suffered for their testimony. (d)	They testified to miracles. (e) The miracles were the same as are recorded in the New Testament. IV. .REFUTATION. Refutation consists in overthrowing arguments and objections opposed to the thesis whioh we wish to con firm. Several particulars with reference to its man¬agement are of great importance. 1. Modes of Refutation. A conclusion can be combated in two ways ; we may prove its contradictory, or we may overthrow the arguments by which it has been supported. (1)	Proving the Contradictory.—Since contradic¬tories cannot both be true, it is a practical refutation of an argument to prove the contradictory of its conclu¬sion. This is often easier than to detect and exhibit the fault of an opposing argument. In this way writers who know nothing of each other's works may refute each other's statements. While important and often sufficient, this mode of procedure is not specific¬ally refutatory. (2)	Overthrowing Arguments.—Refutation, in its specific sense, means the overthrow of an opposing ar¬gument. This overthrow may be accomplished in two ways : we may deny one of the premises, or show a fallacy in the process of reasoning. We may deny the premise when it is false. The false premise is generally suppressed, and the argu¬ment stated as an enthymeme. A syllogistic statement of the argument will generally reveal the falsity of the suppressed premise, and this may then be pointed out. The deistic argument against the divine authority of Moses may be stated thus: Major, A divinely appointed lawgiver would cer¬tainly reveal the doctrine of immortality ; Minor, Moses does not mention it ; Conclusion, Moses was not a divinely appointed lawgiver. The deistic argument, as stated by its advocates, suppressed the major premise, which was supplied by Warburton,* who denies its truth, and thus refutes their argument. One way of showing the falsity of a premise is t. make it a premise of a syllogism in which the othei premise is an admitted truth, and hence to draw an absurd conclusion. This proves the falsity of the pre¬mise taken from the opposing argument, for in a co• rect syllogism there is no alternative except to deny a premise or accept the conclusion. The conclusion can¬not be accepted for it is absurd, the supplied premise cannot be denied for it is an admitted truth ; hence the opponent's premise must be false. The conclusion of an opponent may be made a premise and proved false in the same manner. This is called the indirect argument, or reductio ad absurdum. It is particularly adapted to controversy on account of its irony, and power to turn the laugh on an opponent. It is said of an argument which can be thus answered, "the argu¬ment proves too much," since, if true, absurdities would logically follow from it. In his "Defence of Natural Society by a Late Noble Lord," Burke, feign¬ing to accept the principles of Bolingbroke, makes the arguments brought by the latter against ecclesiastical institutions overthrow civil society as well, thus show¬ing that the arguments prove too much. The detection of fallacies in the reasoning is a purely logical process. If a fallacy exist, it will be found by running over the list of fallacies given in Logic, and testing the argument with respect to each. When the fallacy is seen the simplest refutation is the . construction of a parallel case in which the logical fault will be evident to all. 2. Treatment of ObJeotions. Objections may be offered which are not express(' in the form of arguments. In order to exhibit their argumentative value they should be thrown into a reg¬ular syllogistic form. If this be impossible, the oppo¬nent may be challenged to show the bearing of his objection ; if it be exhibited as a syllogism, its answer will be more readily suggested. Several rules of a special character deserve attention in the treatment of objections. (1)	Valid Objections on Both Sides.—There may be valid objections on both sides of a question. If two armies are contending, one advocate may rightly urge the superior skill of his friends, another may claim the superior equipment of his friends, as reasons why each should be victorious. Both sides here have reasons for expecting victory, both sides are met with objections, and no logic but the logic of events can decide between the opposing claims. Even in physical science such objections may exist on both sides. There are objec tions to the infinite divisibility of matter, and objections to the contradictory doctrine. These difficulties often grow out of the limitation of our faculties and the re¬lativity of our knowledge. Valid objections should be candidly explained as referable to such a deficiency in our powers or our knowledge. (2)	Deoisive Objections.—Objections to our views may be offered which are not only valid, but really de¬cide the question at issue. Such objections should be acknowledged as final. It is more expedient, to say nothing of the ethical quality of the action, to acknowl¬edge error than to resist palpable truth. No one believes in our infallibility when we are not moved by obvious truth, but a confession of error inspires con¬fidence in one's honesty of purpose. There is sometimes a sophistical acknowledgment for no other purpose Ow the establishment of a reputation for fairness. (3) Statement of .Objections.-11 objections are not stated in their full force, there is danger of pro¬ducing the opinion that we either underestimate the full force of the opposing statements, or are not pre¬pared to meet them. On the other hand, it is still more unfair, if not so inexpedient, to overstate objec¬tions, making them appear to be made against more than they really oppose. Thus a person who objects to a certain interpretation of the Scriptures is often represented as rejecting the authority of the whole book. Those who object to certain modes of public trial and punishment are sometimes answered as if they rejected all administration of justice. 3. Cautions concerning Refutation. The attempt to satisfy other minds that our ideas alone are correct is attended with some special dangers. (1)	Too Forcible Befatation.—A violent attack upon some objection or argument may magnify unduly its importance. When a man lays aside his coat and makes great preparation for labor, it leads us to sup¬pose that he is impressed with the magnitude of his task. A debater may easily give his auditors a similar impression by laboring too obviously to overthrow an objection. (2)	Too Great Clearneas.—If any new proposition be established too clearly, it may create surprise that any one could ever have doubted it, or that wise men should have failed to discover it, or that so able a man as your opponent could possibly dissent from it, and hence it may be concluded that there is some subtile fallacy in your argument, which it is difficult to detect. (3) Prior Convictions.—This will be more likely to be the case it the persons addressed have themselves strongly held the opinions controverted. They are unwilling to believe that they have been so long em¬bracing nonsense without knowing it. It is more nat¬ural to conclude that the speaker or writer is either ignorant of some fact, or that his argument is fal• lacious. (1) Aocusatione.—This feeling reaches its height and is accompanied with indignation when a direct charge of criminality or imbecility is made against those who hold the opinion refuted. Men who have been actuated by right motives in holding these views, and there are generally some such in every sect oi party, know the unfairness and untruthfulness of these charges. They, at least, di0 not hold the opinions con¬demned, from any other that pure motives, and they do not believe themselves wholly stupid. They, there¬fore, prefer to regard their calumniator as a foe, whose arguments they may not answer, but whose conclusions they indignantly repel. (5) Weak Arguments.—When the arguments to be refuted are excessively weak, it is often difficult to make them appear more foolish than they seem to be, without a direct charge of absurdity. As such argu¬ments are usually advanced by such persons as are not really convinced by them, but who must say something, they are ..ot likely to convince any one else. If they are answered by really strong arguments, they will have no force with the candid, and to others the most .uocessful refutation will be of small account, for "One convinced against his will, Is of the same opinion still." . (6)	Aoceseible Anthcrities.—It is generally best to use only those authorities which are accessible to the class addressed. Appeals to writers in other languages and to unknown philosophers will have very little weight, if the opponent chooses to deny that the citations apply. People holding different views from those maintained suspect subtlety when a reasoner seta aside the received translation of the Scriptures, and attempts to expound the original. However necessary this may be in order to arrive at truth, this procedure is looked upon as a resort of one whose views are not confirmed by the received version, but who can wrest the original to his purpose without the risk of detec¬tion. None but recognized scholars are safe in attempts of this kind, and even they are less liable to miscon¬struction when they are addressing those competent to understand their exposition. These remarks are not so fully applicable to those who are addressing persons who are already convinced. (7)	Place for Answering Objections. —Whately advises placing the answer of objections in the middle of the argument, but nearer the beginning than the end. He says on this point : "If indeed very strong objections have obtained much currency, or have been just stated by an opponent, so that what is asserted is likely to be regarded as paradoxical, it May be advis• able to begin with a refutation ; but when this is not the case, the mention of objections in the opening will be likely to give a paradoxical air to our assertion, by implying a consciousness that much may be said against it. If again all mention of objections be deferred to the last, the arguments will often be listened to with prejudice by those who may suppose us to be overlook¬ing what may be urged on the other side. Sometimes indeed it will be difficult to give a satisfactory refuta¬tiott of the opposed opinions, till we have gone through the arguments in support of our own ; even in that case, however, it will be better to take some brief no¬tice of them early in the composition, with a promise of afterwards considering them more fully, and refut¬ing them." * ,/*